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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JAMES H. BECKSTROM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No.

8027

PAUL WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

This was an action brought by plaintiff against the
defendant for damages for personal injuries and for
property damage as a result of a collision between a
tractor on which plaintiff was riding and the truck
driven by the defendant on August 3, 1951 near the
Benjamin Crossroads in Benjamin, Utah County, Utah.
The defendant, Paul Williams, filed a counterclaim for
damages to his motor vehicle and for personal injuries.
The case was tried to a jury commencing on F'ebruary
16, 1953 and concluding on February 17, 1953, with the
Hon. R. L. Tuckett, Judge, presiding. The jury returned
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

verdicts of no cause of action on plaintiff's complaint
and also on defendant's counterclaim. The appeal is
taken by the plaintiff from the verdict of the jury no
cau8e oi' action on plaintiff's complaint.
srrATEMENT OF FACT
rl,he accident out of which this action arose occurred
on August 3, 1951 at about 4:30P.M. on a highway known
as state road No. 228 which runs north and south in
Benjamin, Ctah County, [tah. The point of the accident
was just north of the point known as Benjamin Crossroads. The hard surface portion of the highway in the
vicinity of where the accident occurred ranges from 21
to :22 feet wide so that it would be from 10¥2 to 11 feet
each side of the center of the highway (R. 186). At the
point where the accident occurred there is a private lane
leading from the home of Arch Beckstrom, a brother of
the plaintiff, which said driveway as it comes from the
yard of the Beckstrom home crosses over a culvert. The
driveway at that point is approximately 25 feet wide,
the culvert extending some distance beyond the 25 foot
width of the private driveway (R. 186). The tractor on
which the plaintiff was sitting at the time the collision
occurred was a John Deere Model A tractor, having a
weight of 5, 046 lbs. (R. 177). The tractor has an overall
length of 11112 feet; the driver's seat was at the extreme
rear, between the rear wheels, it being 11 feet from the
rear of the driver's seat to the front of the tractor and
9 feet from the front of the seat to the front of the
tractor front wheel. The rear wheels were 5 feet in
diameter. From the steering wheel to the front of th~
2
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tractor hood is 7 feet 6 in. (R. 49-50).
At the tune the collision occurred there was a heavy
growth of weeds, willows and trees along the fence line
and barrow pit on the west side of the road and particularly extending along said side of the road north from
the driveway.
Just prior to the accident the plaintiff Beckstrom
had gone in to the yard of the Arch Beckstrom home
and hooked a side-delivery rake onto the tractor. He
then proceeded to pull said side-delivery rake with said
tractor out of the driveway of the Beckstrom yard and
onto the highway, his intention being to turn north after
he got onto the highway. After he passed his brother's
house, which is near the fence line, he stopped and
checked his equipn1ent. He then started out again and
was just creeping along, barely moving, as he started
out of the driveway and onto the highway. He could
not see down the highway until he had got outside and
beyond the fence line on account of the high weeds and
trees that were along the fence line and ditch bank (R.
50). Plaintiff stated that as he was crossing over the
culvert which is at the fence line, he was practically to
a stop ; that he was just creeping along at not more than
1 mile to llf2 miles per hour (R. 50-51). There is no
evidence whatsoever in the entire record that the plaintiff was at any time prior to the collision, nor at the
time of the collision, travelling more than llf2 miles per
hour. His testimony as to that speed is the only evidence
in the record concerning the speed of the tractor. As
soon as the plaintiff got far enough beyond the fence

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

line whPn• he could see, he looked up and down the road.
II e could not see anything coming from the south, but
Itt~ could see the truck coming from the north toward
him, at a !"!J<'<'d which he estimated to be around 45 or
;>o tuilP~ per hour (It 51-52). At the time he could first
look do\\'n thP highway and could first see the defendant's
tru<'k approa<·lting from the north, the plaintiff in his
position sitting on the tractor seat and leaning forward
would have heen about 10 feet beyond the fence line (R.
51), and the front wheel of plaintiff's tractor was almost
to the west edge of the hard surfaced portion of the
highway (R. 51). At that time the plaintiff estimated
that the defendant's truck was about 300 to 325 feet north
of him (R. 51). The plaintiff's own words as to what
he did immediately when he saw the defendant's truck
coming at a distance of about 325 feet were as follows:

"I shut off the gas and throwed it into neutral
and it kind of - there is a little swale down
through there and it kind of coasted down, and I
jumped up and shut off the gas and throwed it
into neutral and pulled on the brake. I pulled
on the hand clutch, it serves as sort of a brake
on the tractor, and it came to rest with the front
wheels just out on the highway." (R. 52).
He further stated that he applied the foot brake
and the hand brake and stood with his foot on the foot
brake to hold the tractor at a complete stop (R. 74-75).
Plaintiff stated that at the time the tractor came to
rest the front wheels were about 5 feet out onto the hard
surface of the highway, which would place them about
5 feet west of the center line of the highway (R. 52).
4
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He stated that by the time the trador was brought to
a stop in the position indicated, the defendant's truck
was approximately 1:25 feet frmn the tractor. When
asked what he then did, he stated:
"\Yell, I was practically helpless, I held the
brake on and I was wondering all the time whyI was expecting this truck to either stop or make
a turn because he had room enough to get out
. around me. I was standing there on the platform,
I didn't have any ti1ne to back up and put it in
any other gears, I just stood there wondering
why he didn't make an effort of smne kind to
make a turn or stop." (R. 53).
The truck of the defendant continued on and struck
the tractor of the plaintiff broadside, the truck hitting
the tractor between the front and back wheels. The
impact knocked the two and a half ton tractor about
30 or 40 feet south straight along the edge of the highway, the two vehicles being stuck together as they came
to a stop ( R. 54). The tractor tire marks as it was
pushed along the edge of the highway sideways went
straight south (R. 98). There were no tire marks at all
except those made by the tractor as it was pushed sideways (R. 98), and there were no tire marks at all north
of the point of impact (R. 98).
There was testimony that at the time the defendant's
truck passed the Bingham home about between 450 and
600 feet north of the point of collision, the truck was
travelling between 40 and 60 miles per hour (R. 104).
The testimony of both James R. Bingham and Alpheus
Bingham was that from the road in front of their home,
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approximately 450 to 600 feet north of the accident, they
eould look down the road and clearly see the vehicles
wlu·re they had collided and that the vision was good (R.
104-105, 111). They stated that the back wheels of the
tra<"tor as it came to rest after the collision were just off
the highway, and that the marks from the tractor wheels
went Htraight south along the edge of the highway (R.
I o;, ). 'l'he defendant stated that he first noticed the tractor when he was about 65 feet from the point of impact
(R. 152). When he first noticed the tractor, he did not
just notice the front wheels emerging from behind the
bushes or brush, but noticed the whole tractor (R. 161).
'11 he defendant said when he first saw the tractor when
he came down the highway, it was about 2 or 3 feet west
of the oiled portion of the west side of the highway,
travelling east (R. 150), and he believed the tractor
moved 5 or 6 feet from the time he saw it until the time
of the impact (R. 162). He estimated his speed at the
time of the impact was about 40 miles per hour (R. 148).
He stated he was able to apply his brakes before the
accident and did apply them and felt them take hold
(R. 151), but the evidence is undisputed that there was
no physical evidence on the highway of any brake marks
from the defendant's truck. Exhibits A, B, C and D are
photographs taken of the scene of the accident and the
vicinity thereof. Exhibit A is a photograph of the highway looking from north to south and sh'owing the driveway from which the plaintiff's tractor entered the highway. Said driveway is indicated by an automobile standing on the culvert and across the fence line of the drive6
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way. rrhe telephone pole which is shown in the picture
north of the driYeway is 100 feet north of the point of
impact (R. 87). Exhibit B is a photograph taken from
the extre1ne north edge of the driveway and shows the
road looking from tl1e driyeway at the fence line as one
looks north. Exhibit C is a photograph taken looking
north along the highway from a point south of the driveway. Exhibit D is a photograph taken from the point
on the highway where the plaintiff Beckstrom believed
the defendant's truck was when he first saw it. This
picture also shows the position of the tractor on the
highway at the tin1e when Beckstrom first saw the
defendant's truck approaching (R. 91).
Plaintiff requested that the court submit to the
jury instructions embodying the doctrine of the last
clear chance. The court refused to submit such instructions to the jury or to permit the jury to consider such
doctrine.
STATEMENT OF· POINTS
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DOCTRINE OF LAST
CLEAR CHANCE, AND IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10, 13, 14 EMBODYING THE LAW AS IT
RELATES TO THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.

POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AS REGARDS THE DUTY OF A PERSON
MOVING A TRACTOR ONTO THE HIGHWAY.
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POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE
PLAINTIFF TO INTRODUCE THE EVIDENCE BY THE
WITNESS KENNETH J ..TANNER AS TO THE STATEMENT
MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE PRESENCE OF SAID
TANNER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE COLLISION,
WITH REGARD TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING
THAT SUCH STATEMENT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF AND INCONSISTENT
WITH THE IMPEACHING TESTIMONY OF OFFICER
BEARDALL.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DOCTRINE OF LAST
CLEAR CHANCE, AND IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10, 13, 14 EMBODYING THE LAW AS IT
RELATES TO THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.

It is our position that the evidence in this case
clearly brings the matter within the doctrine of last
clear chance and that the plaintiff was entitled to have
the case submitted to the jury under his theory and to
have the jury consider the evidence under instructions
with regard to the doctrine of last clear chance. We do
not believe it necessary to discuss in detail the numerous
cases involving consideration of the doctrine of last
clear chance by the Utah courts, because each case
involving the application or non-application of such
doctrine stands peculiarly on its own set of facts. The
only thing that need be considered is as to what rules
are applicable, as related to the doctrine of last clear

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I'-.:,

ehanet> under the deeisions of this eourt, and to t ht>n
apply such rule8< to the facts and eYidt>neP pre~Pnh•d in
this ease.
One of the later eases decided hy the Supre1ne Court
of the State of Utah and wherein the Court sets forth
the rules and requisites necessary to bring the case
within the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, is the case of
Compton r. Ogden Union Railzcay & Depot Co., 235 Pac.
(2d) 515. In that case, as in numerous other cases (See
Andersen z·. Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co., 21-1 Pac. (2d)
607; Holmgren v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 198 Pac.
(2d) -±59; Jlorby v. Rogers, 252 Pac. (2d) 231) our
Supreme Court has stated that the case law in Utah
gives approval to the rule promulgated by the American
Law Institute Restatement of Torts, Volume II, Sections
479 and· 480, as being the law of this State. Section 479
of the Restatement of Torts reads as follows:
"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected
himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's
.subsequent negligence may recover for harm
caused thereby, if immediately preceding the
harm, (a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by
the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care and
(b) the defendant (i) knows of the plaintiff's
situation and realizes the helpless peril involved
therein; or (ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation
and has reason to realize the peril involved therein, or (iii) would have discovered the plaintiff's
situation and thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril had he exercised the vigilance
which it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise,
and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and competence his then
9
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~'Xisting ability to avoid harn1ing the plaintiff."

In referring to the above quoted Section as adopted
and approved by the Case Law of Utah, our Supreme
( 'ourt in tlte L!ompton case, supra, stated:
"That section deals with situations where the
plaintiff is unable to avoid the consequences of
lt(·r own negligence or what is often referred to
as 'inPxtricable peril', and by reason thereof, the
d<>fendant alone has the last clear chance to avert
an injury to the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff is
thus in a position of inextricable peril the defendant is liable either (1) if the defendant knows
the plaintiff's situation and realizes or has reason
to realize her helpless peril, or (2) in the case
where a duty exists toward the plaintiff, if in the
exercise of reasonable vigilance the defendant
should have discovered the plaintiff's helpless
situation in time to avoid injury. But this is so
only if the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest ·
and plaintiff is thereafter unable by the exercise
of reasonable vigilance and care to avoid the
injury herself."
Let us then for a moment consider the case here
before the court in the light of said Section 479 as said
Section has been interpreted by this Court. There, of
course, can be no question but that plaintiff is entitled
to have the case submitted to the jury under plaintiff's
theory of the case, with instructions embodying the
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, if under the evidence
as construed most favorably to the plaintiff the jury
might reasonably find the facts to be such as to permit
the application of that doctrine to the case.
In order to emphasize the applicability of the

10
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doctrine of la~t clear chance to this case, we shall apply
step by step the testimony and evidence presented to
the tests laid down in Section 47~) of the Restatement of
Torts above referred to.
1. The fir~ t part of the Rule assun1es that the
plaintiff had himself negligently subjected himself to a
risk of harm frorn the defendant's subsequent negligence.
From the verdict rendered by the jury in returning verdicts of "no cause of action" both upon the plaintiff's
complaint and upon defendant's counterclaim, it appears
definite that the jury considered the plaintiff was guilty
of some negligence.
2. The next test as defined by said Section as construed by this Court, is that the plaintiff's negligence
has come to rest and the plaintiff is thereafter unable
to avoid harm to himself by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance and care. The plaintiff testified that as he
drove his tractor out from the driveway and inched it
toward the highway at not to exceed one and one-half
miles per hour, as soon as he got out far enough so he
could see, he saw the defendant's truck coming from the
north, about 325 feet away, and he immediately put on
the brakes and shut off the gas by shutting down the
lever and then grabbed the hand brake and pulled it
back and stood up on the foot brake to hold the tractor
from going further forward; that by the time this could
be done the defendant's truck had reached a point 125
feet away from him and was bearing down upon him at
a speed in excess of 40 miles per hour; that there was no
time to change gears or back up, and in standing with
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his foot on the foot brake to hold the tractor from going
forward, he was practically helpless (R. 52, 53, 74, 75).
During the interval from the time the defendant's truck
WUH 1~;, ft>et or more from the point of impact until the
t i HIP of impact the plaintiff's tractor was at a standstill
at a point with the front wheel approximately 5 feet
onto thP concrete, which would place the wheel approxilltatt>ly 5 feet west of the center line of the highway.
CPrtainly under the conditions indicated,with the plaintiff, a man of 65 years of age, sitting upon a heavy,
unmaneuverable tractor, the conclusion is inescapable
that plaintiff was in a position of "inextricable peril"
from which he could not save himself within the period
of time available to him.
This Court has set forth the next test under two
alternatives, so that if either is applicable, then the case
comes within the Last Clear Chance Doctrine. These two
alternatives are:
(a) The defendant knows the plaintiff's situation
and realizes or has reason to realize his helpless peril, or
(b) In the case where a duty exists toward the
plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable vigilance the
defendant should have discovered the plaintiff's helpless
situation in time to avoid injury.
The evidence which the jury could have found to be
true in this case was sufficient to have brought the matter under either or both of said alternatives. We will
consider these alternatives separately as follows:
1.

The defendmnt knows the plaintiff's situation and

12
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realize::; or has reason to rea/i.ze his helpless peril.

;..

The defendant's own testimony brings the case
within the fir:::;t alternative. The defendant testified
that when he first saw the tractor on which plaintiff was
riding that the front wheel of the tractor was two or
three feet west of the oil portion of the west side of the
highway, traveling east (R. 150); that at the tin1e of the
impact the tractor was two or three feet west of the
center of the highway, and that the tractor moved five
or six feet from the time he first saw it until the time
of impact (R. 158, 162); that at least one-half of the
highway plus at least two or three feet was unobstructed
so that he could have driven around front of the tractor
and no other cars were coming from the south (R. 159).
The only evidence in the record as to the speed the
tractor was traveling was from one to one and one-half
miles per hour. As a matter of fact, if the tractor did
travel from a point two or three feet west of the oiled
portion of the highway to a point two or three feet west
of the center line of the highway from the time the
defendant saw it until the time of the impact, then, since
the one-half of the highway is approximately 10 feet
wide, the tractor travelled approximately 10 feet from
the time the defendant says he first saw it until the time
of the impact, according to his own testimony (R. 150,
158). At the greatest speed it was testified it was travelling, namely, one and one-half miles per hour the tractor
would move 2.19 feet per second. If the tractor travelled
only 6 feet from the time defendant saw it until the
impact, it would have taken in excess of 2 and one-half

13
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~('(·onds to go that distance and during the sa1ne period
0

I' time at the minimum speed which anyone stated
<lt·l't·ndant waH traveling, namely 40 miles per hour,
d<'fendunt would have travelled a distance of 146 feet.
11PIH'l', his own figures place him not 65 feet away from
thP plaintiff at the time he first saw the plaintiff's tractor, but at least 146 feet away. Of course, if the tractor
actually travelled 10 feet from the time defendant first
saw it, as his t(~stinwny would warrant believing, then
hi~ distance away from plaintiff would be correspondin~dy increased. At the distance, however, of 146 feet, defendant had ample time to stop his vehicle or sufficiently
slow it down or turn out around the tractor so as to avoid
the impact and the injury to the plaintiff. There is no
question that the defendant not only had reason to
realize plaintiff's peril, but in fact knew of plaintiff's
peril because he states that the instant he saw the tractor
he knew it was not going to stop (R. 151).
2. In the case where a duty exists toward the plain·
tiff, in the exercise of reasonable vigilance the defemilalnt
should have discovered the plaintiffs helpless situation
in time to avoid injury.
Certainly no one can look at the evidence and deny
that this case comes within the second alternative,
namely, that the defendant would have discovered the
plaintiff's situation and thus had reason to realize plaintiff's helpless peril, had he exercised reasonable care
and vigilance. In this connection we call attention to the
fact that, as properly instructed by the court, the defendant had a duty to use due care and diligence in keeping
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a lookout and to actually look for and see all objects
and things reasonably within the range of his vision
and which might constitute a hazard; and further, that it
was his duty to maintain such control over his automobile
that he would be able to stop or turn to avoid a collision
with any other vehicle upon the highway reasonably
within the range of his vision. Under the testimony of
the plaintiff, he could see the defendant's truck at a
distance of 325 feet, from his seat 11 feet back of the
front of the tractor. If this testimony were believed by
the jury, then it is an incontrovertible fact that the
defendant could, if he had been looking and keeping a
proper lookout, have seen the plaintiff and plaintiff's
tractor at least 325 feet prior to the time of the collision,
and had he exercised reasonable care and kept his vehicle
under proper control, he could have stopped long before
his vehicle collided with the tractor. The Bingham boys
testified that the vision was clear from a point between
450 and 600 feet north of the point of impact as one
looked south down the highway. Calling attention to
the photograph, Exhibit A., and the fact that the telephone pole to the north of the driveway is 100 feet north
of the point of impact, such exhibit shows clearly that
a person who chose to look could clearly see a vehicle
standing on the culvert at the fence line even before it
entered the highway or the shoulder of the highway,
from a point considerably farther than 100 feet from the
point of impact. Of course, in determining whether the
last clear chance doctrine is applicable, we have a right
to assume that the jury would believe the evidence of

,.-'
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tlw plaintiff and any other evidence in the light most
l'avorahle to the plaintiff. Bearing that in mind, there
ean lu· no question but that the jury could have found
(and we think they could not properly have found other\\'i~(~) that if tl1P defendant had exercised reasonable care
in k(·(·ping- a proper lookout, and if he had chose to look
and ~PP what was before him down the highway, he could
have :-:<•(•n th<· plaintiff's tractor as it slowly moved out
to\\'ard the hig-hway, at a point when defendant was at
least :3:2;) feet north of the point of the impact; -and at
the time plaintiff's tractor came to a stop, when defendant was at least 123 feet away from said tractor, if the
defendant had chose to look and observe and see what
was there to see, he had plenty of time to stop or otherwise control his automobile so as to avoid the collision.
\Ve therefore submit that there can be no question whatsoever that this alternative portion of the rule is met.

The final test as set forth in Section 479 of the
Restatement of Torts, as interpreted by this court, is as
to whether or not, the evidence having met the previous
test above enumerated, the defendant was negligent in
failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence
his then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.
This, of course, was a question for the jury, and the very
fact that the jury found against the defendant on his
counterclaim shows that the jury concluded that the
defendant was in fact negligent, and from the evidence
before them the jury might very well have found that
the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable care, would
have discovered plaintiff's perilous situation, and that
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after he should have discoyered such perilous situation,
by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence he could
have avoided injury to the plaintiff.
\Ye suggest it should be apparent that, assuming a
belief of plaintiff's evidence, and the other evidence in
the case as nwst favorably construed toward the plaintiff, no case could ever be found which more clearly falls
within the doctrine of last clear chance, as enunciated by
said Section 479 of the Restaten1ent of Torts, and as
applied by this court in the Compton and other cases
hereinabove cited. We call attention to the fact that the
doctrine of last clear chance is more often applicable in
situations where the vehicle being operated by the plaint.iff is a slow moving vehicle, as was the situation in this
case. See Morby v. Rogers above cited.
A second application of the doctrine of last clear
chance is as set forth in Section 480 of the Restatement
of Torts. It will be observed that Section 479 covers
generally a situation where the plaintiff has placed him-·
self in a position of peril from which he cannot extricate
himself and where the defendant either knows, or by the
exercise of reasonable prudence and care, should have
known, of the plaintiff's peril, and thereafter if he had
known of said peril could, by the exercise of reasonable
care, have prevented harm to the plaintiff, but the defendant failed to exercise the care necessary to prevent such
harm; whereas, section 480 refers generally to a situation where the defendant in fact knew of plaintiff's
situation and realized or had reason to realize that
plaintiff was inattentive and, therefore, unlikely to dis-
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eover his peril in time to avoid harm and that defendant
is thereafter negligent in failing to 'utilize with reasonaLle earP his ability to avoid injury. Said Section 480
reads as follows:
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonaLle vigilance could have observed the danger
ereated by the defendant's negligence in time to
hav(' avoided harm therefrom, may recover if,
but only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) realized or had reason to
realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time
to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent
in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing ability to avoid harming
the plaintiff."
While it is our contention that the case falls squarely
and clearly under Section 479 so that the doctrine of last
clear chance should have been submitted to the jury
under that section, we submit that in the light of plaintiff's testimony and other evidence in the case, it was
a matter for the jury to determine as to whether or not
the doctrine of last clear chance applied under Section
480 hereinabove quoted, and that the evidence, if the
jury sought to believe it, would even bring the case_
under the last mentioned section. As hereinabove previously set forth, from the defendant's own testimony
the jury could conclude that he saw the plaintiff and
knew of the plaintiff's perilous situation when he was
a distance of 146 feet from the plaintiff. Defendant
himself says he was 65 feet from the plaintiff when he
knew of plaintiff's perilous situation, but the other testi-
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mony with regard to speed and distances place him at
least 1-lG feet fron1 the plaintiff at that time. As indicated, he further stated that at such time he knew plaintiff's tractor was not going to stop. If the testilnony of
Officer Beardall were to be believed, then the jury might
have concluded that the plaintiff was in fact looking
back and a way frmn the road and toward the west as he
came onto the highway and in1n1ediately prior to the time
of the accident, so that if the defendant actually saw
plaintiff as he says he did, and assuming the distances
as above indicated, then defendant certainly realized or
had reason to realize that plaintiff was inattentive and
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid
the harm. Assuming a belief of the testimony as above
indicated, the jury surely could have found that the
defendant knew, or in the language of the court in the
Compton case "had reason to know" of plaintiff's peril.
Defendant saw that there was no car coming from the
opposite direction. It then became a question for the
jury to determine whether or not, under those conditions,
defendant had a clear chance to avoid injury to the
plaintiff and negligently failed to do so.
The instructions requested by the plaintiff relating
to the doctrine of last clear chance, and particularly the
instructions nmnbered 13 and 14 (R. 23 & 24) were based
upon the wording of Sections 479 and 480 of the Restatement of Torts, as interpreted and approved by this
Court in the Compton and other cases. Plaintiff's counsel endeavored therein to set forth in as clear language
aR possible a fair statement of that doctrine as so
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j n t Prp I'Pt P<l.

\V hile as indicated above, we do not feel it necessary
to di~<·u~s at length the factual situations in numerous

I

,.a~<·~,

in addition to the cases already hereinabove cited,
Wt· <·all the attention of the Court to the Utah cases of
Uralwm r. Johnson, Hifi Pac. (2d) 230, wherein this
<·ourt ~tatPd that in a proper case a verdict should be
di rPdl'd for thP plaintiff under the doctrine of last clear
c-ltaile<·, and in the re-hearing of that case, which is
reported at 172 Pac. (2d) 665, the Court stated that:
"The last clear chance duty is to do what a
prudent person would have done to avoid the
accident had he had the opportunity, whatever
that would be, after he did or should have appreciated the other's peril or approaching peril."
We submit that on the evidence, this case fell clearly
and unequivocally within the provisions of said Section
479 of the Restatement of Torts, so that instructions
should have been given on the doctrine of last clear
chance. We submit also that it fell sufficiently within
the provisions of Section 480, so as to warrant giving
an instruction on last clear chance on the theory of that
Section. We urge that the Court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance, as
requested by the plaintiff, and that such error was
1naterial and substantial.

POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AS REGARDS THE DUTY OF A PERSON
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I

l\IOV ING A TRACTOR ONTO THE HIGHvVAY.

Plaintiff subn1itted to the Court and requested that
it give to the jury his requested instruction No. 11 which
reads as follows :
'"The duty imposed upon the plaintiff in moving his tractor out of the yard and driveway and
onto the highway was to exercise that degree of
care which an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise under similar circumstances. If he did
exercise such care, then there would be no negligence on his part in connection therewith."
The court refused to give such instruction. rrhe
court did, however, give its instruction No. 12, which
reads as follows :
''You are instructed that a driver about to
enter a high\vay from a private road or driveway
shall yield the right of way to vehicles approaching on said highway, and such driver must use
reasonable and ordinary care to avoid a collision
with a vehicle proceeding on said highway."
\Ve submit that having given instruction No. 12 which instruction would place a great burden upon one
entering the highway to watch for and yield the right
of way to approaching vehicles, and greatly emphasized
the duties and obligations of the plaintiff entering the
highway from a private road,- that under such circumstances plaintiff was entitled to have also given to the
jury the balancing instruction as set forth in plaintiff's
proposed instruction No. 11. This instruction simply
sets forth the ordinary rule of negligence, but applies
such ordinary rule to the facts and circumstances as
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wen• present in this case and before the jury for its
consideration.
WP submit that in fairness to the plaintiff and so
as not to over-burden the case with instructions in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff, the plaintiff was
PntitlPd to have given to the jury his Instruction No. 11,
which WP submit everyone must admit is a fair statement
of the law.
POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE
PLAINTIFF TO INTRODUCE THE EVIDENCE BY THE
WITNESS KENNETH J. TANNER AS TO THE STATEMENT
MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE PRESENCE OF SAID
TANNER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE COLLISION,
WITH REGARD TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING
THAT SUCH STATEMENT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF AND INCONSISTENT
WITH THE IMPEACHING TESTIMONY OF OFFICER
BEARD ALL.

The plaintiff testified that the accident occurred in
the manner as hereinabove previously set forth. Officer
Beardall testified that in the X-ray room of the Payson
Hospital, the plaintiff told him that the accident happened in a different manner, and that he never did see
the defendant's truck prior to the collision, and that he,
the plaintiff, was looking back to the west at the time
of the collision.
The plaintiff's testimony having thus been impeached, the plaintiff offered to prove by the witness
Tanner, who was the X-ray technician, that at a time
contemporaneous with the time when Beardall testified
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the ineon~i~tent ~tatement was Inade, that the plaintiff
had in fact made a staternent to hiin, Tanner, as to the
manner in which the accident occurred, which statement
was entirely consistent with the testimony of the plaintiff. The Court refused to permit the witness Tanner
to testify \vith regard to that inconsistent statement.
\Vhile we nmst admit that there is not a uniformity
of agreement among the court as to the admissibility
of such evidence to rebut i1npeaching testimony, nevertheless the rule is recognized in many jurisdictions and
by respectable authority. The rule is recognized in Utah
by this court, although the court states that it should
he applied with extreme caution. (See Hilt·a v. Packard,
10 Utah 78, 37 Pac. 86; State v. Carrington, 15 Utah 480,
50 Pac. 326; Ewing v. J( eith, 16 Utah 312, 52 Pac. 4;
Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah 59, 272 Pac. 229.

---·

Where the rule is recognized, such testimony is
permitted if it is made reasonably soon after the event
and at a time prior to litigation, and at a time when
there was little likelihood that the party making the
statement would have reason to fabricate a story. All
of these conditions, of course, applied as regards the
statement, concerning which the plaintiff sought to have
testimony introduced. In addition thereto, we suggest
that no more favorable situation could ever arise for
invoking exception to the rule against self-serving statements than was present in this case. We say this by
reason of the fact that the statement which we sought to
prove was made to Mr. Tanner at a time very close to
the time of the alleged statement made to Officer
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Beardall, and, furthermore, the statement allegedly made
to Officer Beardall was, according to him, made in the
prP~Pll<'(' of the said Mr. Tanner. Certainly it would
~l'<'ttt lti~hly improbable that the plaintiff would make a
~tatPtnPnt one minute to Mr. Tanner concerning the
manner in whi<'h the accident happened, and in the next
minute make another statement to Officer Beardall, but
in the pr<'~erwe of the same _jlr. Tanner, to the effect that
the aC'eident occurred in an entirely different manner.
t:nder these circumstances, we submit it was error on
the part of the court to refuse to permit the witness
Tanner to testify as to the statement made by the plaintiff with regard to the manner in which the accident
occurred.
We respectfully call the attention of the court to the
annotation appearing in 140 A.L.R., commencing at
page 21.
CONCLUSION
We urge that the Court erred in the manners as
hereinabove set forth and that the verdict of the jury
and the judgment entered thereon should be reve·rsed
and set aside and the case remanded to the district court
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
A. U. MINER,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
AppeUant.
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